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Abstract
Papua New Guinea moved to a limited prefer-
ential voting (LPV) system prior to the 2007
national election. The shift from first-past-the-
post to preferential voting was intended to
encourage the election of candidates with
broader mandates from constituents; to reverse
the trend of increasing election-related
violence; and to lead to more cooperation
between candidates and voting blocs. It was
also anticipated that instituting a preferential
system would increase the electoral chances
of female candidates. This article looks at the
impact of the LPV system on women’s partici-
pation and performances as candidates in
Papua New Guinean elections since 2002,
focusing in particular on the three general
elections in 2007, 2012 and 2017. It argues
that the benefits of LPV have not outweighed
its costs, at least in terms of women’s participa-
tion and representation. This demonstrates the
limits of institutional reform of this nature in
tackling deep-seated issues relating to political
culture.
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1. Introduction
Papua New Guinea moved to a limited prefer-
ential voting (LPV) system prior to the 2007
national election. The shift from first-past-the-
post (FPP) to a preferential system was
intended to encourage the election of candi-
dates with broader mandates from constituents;
to reverse the trend of increasing election-re-
lated violence; and to lead to more cooperation
between candidates and voting blocs (Kaiulo
2002; Reilly 2006). It was expected that LPV
would make elections more expensive and
counting much slower (Kaiulo 2002; Standish
2002), and these predictions have been borne
out (Haley & Zubrinich 2013; Howes 2014).
There have also been unintended consequences
of the shift to LPV, including the proliferation
of vote buying and gifting in campaigns (Haley
& Zubrinich 2015).
One anticipated result of the shift to LPV
was that it would increase the chances of
female candidates (May, Wheen & Haley
2013). Women’s political representation has
always been low in Papua New Guinea—the
number of women in Parliament has ranged
from zero to three since independence,
and women have always made up less than 3
per cent of parliamentarians. It was hoped by
some that LPV would prompt a sea change
in the fortunes of women candidates, with
women gaining further chances in the electoral
contest through the collection of preferences,
as opposed to the winner-takes-all plurality
system under FPP.
For those who had hoped women’s repre-
sentation would increase following the
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electoral system change, results have been dis-
appointing. Women’s representation since the
advent of LPV has followed the inconsistent
pattern of previous elections, with small gains
offset by significant setbacks. After three gen-
eral elections using LPV, Papua New Guinea
has no women in its national parliament, plac-
ing it among the worst in the world in terms
of women’s representation. While electoral
system reform was never going to be a panacea
for the issue of women’s under-representation
in Papua New Guinea politics, it does not seem
to have helped women’s electoral chances at all
beyond a few isolated cases in 2012. In fact,
this article argues that some of the unintended
consequences of LPV—specifically, the in-
creasing prevalence of money politics—have
actually disadvantaged many female candi-
dates, who are effectively priced out of politics
due to limited financial resources.
This article looks at the impact of the LPV
system on women’s participation and perfor-
mances as candidates in Papua New Guinean
elections since 2002.1 To do this, it utilises a
theoretical framework of historical institution-
alism, to track how the electoral system reform
process has been shaped by embedded rules
and norms (Steinmo&Thelen 1992). These in-
stitutions of course impact, and are impacted
by, gender and gender relations. The subfield
of feminist institutionalism has explored these
gendered impacts in various political settings
(Krook & Mackay 2011).
The next section evaluates political culture
and women’s political participation in Papua
New Guinea. The following section looks at
the electoral system history and the LPV
debate. Then, the participation of women,
and success of women candidates, in the
three national general elections since the
introduction of LPV, in 2007, 2012 and 2017
is examined. The concluding section makes
the case that the benefits of LPV have not
outweighed its costs, at least in terms of
women’s participation and representation. This
demonstrates the limits of institutional reform
of this nature in tackling deep-seated issues
relating to political culture.
2. Political culture and women’s political
participation
Papua New Guinean politics is intensely local,
with personal relationships and local issues
prioritised over national interest. The localised
nature of politics sustains the fragmentation of
the political system, characterised by high turn-
over—around 50 per cent in each national elec-
tion—and a weak party system (Seib 2000). In
this political context, kinship and largesse are
key determinants of electoral behaviour, with
party affiliation largely irrelevant in voter
choice (Anere 2000; Ketan 2004; Saffu
1996). Patron–client political relationships
abound, and the primary role of a politician is
increasingly seen as project management of
service delivery infrastructure projects within
their constituency rather than their parliamen-
tary duties (Ketan 2007; Rynkiewich 2000).
The primacy of patronage politics is often
explained with reference to customary ‘big-
man’ political organisation (Rynkiewich
2000; Sahlins 1963) and traditions of gift-giv-
ing. Yet, as Ketan (2004, 2007) notes, culture
is often manipulated in these political practices
in a manner which ignores the transparency
and accountability measures employed in
cultural exchanges, and cultural explanations
often generalise and oversimplify traditional
models of leadership. Political culture has
undoubtedly evolved in the postcolonial era;
the ‘individual MP has become a “super
big-man”, creating a level of politics that has
eclipsed and/or swallowed other modes of
local political activity’ (Stewart & Strathern
1998, 134).
Gender necessarily impacts political and
electoral behaviour in Papua New Guinea.
Women have continuously been under-repre-
sented in formal politics, at both national and
1. For this research, I have drawn on the significant body
of work around elections and electoral reform in Papua
NewGuinea. I amparticularly indebted to thematerial from
international and domestic observation projects for the
2007, 2012 and 2017 elections. In 2017, I was involved
in the ANU-SSGM Domestic Observation Project of the
national elections, and this experience informs my analysis.
I am very grateful for the work of TerenceWood in creating
the PNG Elections Database (http://devpolicy.org/
pngelections/), an invaluable resource.
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subnational levels. The political sphere is
viewed as an inherently masculine domain,
a perspective reinforced by dominant cultural
and religious beliefs on gender relations
where women are expected to play a back-
ground role in public affairs. Voting, based
as it often is on familial and kinship obliga-
tions, is a process in which many women
are expected to follow the lead of a family
or community leader:
In respect of ‘recalcitrant’ women—regardless of
whether they are highly educated, ‘liberated’, or
whatever the case might be—a blow over the ear
with a pointed knuckle is usually a sufficient
physical reminder that good Hagen wives should
always vote the same way as their husbands.
(Ketan 2004, 79).
This pressure can be implicit or explicit, with
female voters generally reported higher levels
of intimidation in casting their vote (Haley &
Zubrinich 2013).
There is a history of women’s electoral
activism in Papua New Guinea, led by groups
such as the National Council of Women and
Women in Politics, and focused on promoting
the election of more women. Efforts include
workshops for aspiring female candidates in
the lead-up to general or local level elections,
a practice that goes back to at least 1997 (Anere
2000; Sepoe 2002). Women’s groups have
supported electoral reform to increase the
number of female candidates and/or politi-
cians, including the push for reserved seats
for women in the 2007–2012 parliamentary
term. Lobbying efforts secured a provision in
the Organic Law on Provincial and Local
Level Government that mandates nominated
seats for women on provincial assemblies and
local councils, and a provision in the Organic
Law on the Integrity of Political Parties and
Candidates that provides financial incentives
for parties to endorse female candidates.
While these efforts have seen some success,
institutional measures to guarantee women’s
political representation, especially the reserved
seats initiative, have faced significant public
and political resistance within Papua New
Guinea (Baker 2014). Even where reforms to
encourage women’s participation in politics
have been implemented, existing institutions
have proved resistant to substantive change.
Curtin (2018) writes that ‘informal institutions
that are less codified and often related to cul-
ture, colonisation, and clientelism … derive
their longevity from societal institutions with
significant cultural capital’ (see also
Bjarnegård 2013). These informal norms can
resist or subvert the aims of reforms.
3. The limited preferential voting debate in
Papua New Guinea
The value of holding elections is generally
uncontested in democratic politics; the method
of voting in those elections, however, is often a
topic of much debate. Colonial legacies play a
significant role in determining electoral
processes in the Pacific region, and some
systems have remained unchanged since inde-
pendence. Yet electoral system reform offers
an opportunity to engineer for (or against)
certain outcomes.
Papua New Guinea, at the time a territory of
Australia, used an alternative vote (AV) elec-
toral system in elections in 1964, 1968 and
1972. After independence in 1975, the decision
was made to shift to a FPP system prior to the
1977 election. The rationale for this change
was that FPP was less complex for voters and
counting staff while being similar enough to
the previous system—in that voters were
electing an individual representative to repre-
sent their geographical area in Parliament—to
prevent confusion.
Reilly (2002, p.165) labelled the decision to
adopt FPP ‘a move that had devastating conse-
quences for the nascent political system’. The
FPP system was in place for six national gen-
eral elections. In that time, candidate numbers
grew exponentially from 869 to 2,818 and
from an average of 8.1 per constituency in
1977 to 25.9 in 2002 (Reilly 2002). Relatedly,
the share of the vote won by winning candi-
dates was declining; in the last general election
held using FPP, the average vote share of suc-
cessful candidates was under 20 per cent, and
one candidate won his seat with just 6 per cent
of the vote (Standish 2006). As Seib (2000, 7)
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put it, under FPP ‘most people’s votes are cast
to the wind’. Some policymakers and aca-
demics, including Reilly, actively promoted a
shift to a different voting system. While other
systems were considered, preferential voting
was considered to be a way of achieving
broader mandates for representatives while
maintaining single-member constituencies.
Thus, the LPV system came about. The sys-
tem is ‘limited’ in that voters only distribute
preferences to three candidates rather than
ranking all candidates as in other preferential
voting systems. This was considered important
as it reduced the complexity of the new
electoral system for voters in a country with
relatively low levels of literacy and numeracy.
A key objective of the shift to LPV was
engineering stronger mandates for elected
members of Parliament. The use of preferential
voting would in theory facilitate the election
of candidates with wider support bases
(Okole 2005; Reilly 1996). An assumption
was that this would create a ‘better’ class of pol-
iticians, potentially decreasing the high levels of
incumbent turnover at each election, usually
around 50 per cent. A campaign run by Trans-
parency International PNG in 2001 claimed that
LPV would result in the election of members of
Parliament (MPs) of a higher calibre
(Standish 2006). It was also suggested that
LPV would reduce the number of candidates
over time (Anere 2000; Reilly 1996).
It was predicted that LPV would lead to less
violence and greater cooperation between
candidates (Reilly 1996, 2002). Reducing elec-
tion-related violence was a key concern, as the
2002 election had been described as the worst
in Papua New Guinea’s history, with wide-
spread violence and failed elections declared
in six electorates. It was also claimed that under
LPV, candidates would be incentivised to
reach out to voters beyond their bloc of key
supporters and to build alliances with other
candidates for second and third preference
exchanges. This would potentially strengthen
political parties as well, by encouraging elec-
toral alliances (May, Wheen & Haley 2013).
Increasing women’s representation was not
the main objective of electoral system reform in
Papua New Guinea, but it was an issue of
concern both within the country and globally.
The move to LPV was seen as beneficial to
women, in that it would increase female voters’
freedom of choice (Haley & Dierikx 2013). In
a political context where voter intimidation and
bloc voting were commonplace, voters—espe-
cially women voters—often faced pressured
from their family or community to vote for a
certain candidate. It was hypothesised that under
LPV, voters would have more freedom to
allocate their second and third preferences. The
argument that this would benefit female candi-
dates rests on the assumption that female voters
would, in the absence of intimidation or coer-
cion, be predisposed to vote for women. This is
of course not necessarily true (Baker 2017a).
There were warnings of potential negative
impacts of the shift to LPV. Fraenkel (2004,
p. 127) wrote ‘The adoption of preferential
voting is likely to put extraordinary pressure
on Papua New Guinea’s electoral administra-
tion.’ It was predicted that the election process
would be more expensive (Kaiulo 2002;
Standish 2002); that processes would become
more complicated for voters and electoral
staff (Fraenkel 2004; Standish 2002); and
that there would be a rise in invalid votes
(Fraenkel 2004). Prior to implementation,
critics of the proposed reform cast doubt that
it would achieve some of its aims, such as
lower candidate numbers and greater coopera-
tion between political individuals and groups
(Standish 2002).
Nevertheless, public expectations were high
surrounding the shift to LPV. The shift to LPV
was approached not just as a technical change
but as a move that would transform the politi-
cal culture of Papua New Guinea (Standish
2006). Electoral system reform would bring
order to what was a ‘disorderly democracy’
(May 2003). Part of this transformation would
be the increased engagement of women, as
(autonomous) voters and as parliamentarians.
4. The 2007 election
For the most part, the high expectations at-
tached to LPV have not been met in Papua
New Guinea elections since 2002. In the initial
by-elections under LPV and in the 2007
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election, it was noted that candidates showed
little understanding of the new LPV system
(May, Wheen & Haley 2013; Standish 2006).
The expected cooperation between candidates
in preference exchange was not evident in the
early days of LPV (Standish 2006; Haley &
Anere 2009). In the 2007 election, candidates
were wary of giving instructions on how to
distribute preferences to their supporters,
suggesting that even where strategy could be
employed by candidates it was seen as a poten-
tial risk that could detract from a campaign
(May, Wheen & Haley 2013). There was less
election-related violence reported than in the
past, although more security was in place, es-
pecially in Southern Highlands in the 2007
election (May, Wheen & Haley 2013; see also
Reilly 2006; Standish 2006). In 2007, 2,759
candidates nominated, including 101 women.
This was the first time since 1964 that candi-
date numbers had decreased from the previous
election; candidate numbers, however, were
still relatively high, with up to 69 candidates
contesting a single seat.
The 2007 general election was not the first
time LPV had been used in Papua New
Guinea; 10 national by-elections held between
2003 and 2006 in Papua New Guinea used the
system. Reviewing the six earliest by-elections
under LPV, Standish (2006) notes lower rates
of intimidation than in the previous general
election, with voters claiming to feel free to
exercise their second and third preferences.
This was especially true of women, although
there was no apparent associated advantage to
women candidates (Standish 2006). Winning
candidate mandates in these early by-elections
increased from past national elections (Reilly
2006) but were still under 30 per cent in most
cases. In the two cases in which mandates were
closer to 50 per cent, the seats were won by ‘es-
pecially strong candidates’ with high-profile
political connections (Standish 2006, p. 201).
It was predicted that the new system would
lead to a higher rate of invalid votes (Fraenkel
2004), but this was not evident in the initial
by-elections under LPV (Reilly 2006).
The 2007 election was largely disappointing
in terms of outcomes for women (Sepoe 2013).
Under LPV, any advantages gained in the
distribution of preferences were offset by a
poor first preference vote, leading to an exclu-
sion early in the counting process (Anere &
Wheen 2013). Ultimately, the results for
women in 2007 were the same as 2002; a sole
woman was elected, Dame Carol Kidu in
Moresby South Open. While Kidu won under
the LPV system, she was not particularly
advantaged by it. She won fewer preferences
overall than the man who eventually placed
second, but a strong first preference vote count
ensured her victory (Anere & Wheen 2013).
Kidu’s experience was not unique. In the
2007 election, the vast majority of successful
candidates—approximately four out of five—
were the leaders after the first preference count
in their constituency (May, Wheen & Haley
2013). This suggests that in most cases, LPV
did not substantively change outcomes; the
winner under LPVwould have most likely also
been the winner had the election taken place
under a FPP system. On average, incoming
MPs had the support of one-third of voters at
the final tally (May, Wheen & Haley 2013).
This was an improvement on the one-fifth
average mandate in 2002 but still far short of
a majority.
Reports from the 2007 election suggested
that the shift to LPV had increased the preva-
lence of vote-buying. While a trend towards
increased money politics had been observed
under FPP (Standish 1996), LPVoffered more
opportunities for those selling their votes;
under LPV, voters were able to elicit cash in
exchange for votes from up to three candidates
in a constituency, whereas before, they could
only vote for one candidate (Gibbs 2013;
Haley & Dierikx 2013). Furthermore, where
candidates were allowed more freedom of
movement in the LPVenvironment, they were
obliged to pay for the privilege; more access to
voters generally meant more demands for
payment (Haley & Dierikx 2013).
Assessing the impact of LPVon the 2007
election, May, Wheen and Haley (2013, p.
203) wrote ‘The general consensus seems to
be that LPV has been a qualified success,
though it has not, at this stage, done much to
change deeply rooted patterns of behaviour in
much of the country.’ This analysis was
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echoed by scholars discussing women’s expe-
riences in particular: ‘LPV did little or nothing
to change the perception and mindset of
women voters …. The cultural and social envi-
ronment remains largely unchanged’ (Sepoe
2013, p. 143; see also Gibbs 2013). Men still
asserted dominance of women’s electoral
choices in areas where that behaviour was
observed in the past. While LPV may have
increased women’s vote share overall due to
distribution of preferences (May, Wheen &
Haley 2013), it did not substantively change
outcomes in the vast majority of cases, so its
impact on women’s representation overall
was nil.
5. The 2012 election
The 2012 election saw a huge rise in the num-
ber of candidates contesting. Overall, 3,435
candidates contested, a 25 per cent increase,
including 135 women. The small dip in the
number of candidates in 2007, therefore,
seemed an aberration rather than an indication
of an emerging trend. While most candidates
were able to move around freely, the campaign
period was not as calm as 2007 (Haley &
Zubrinich 2013), another sign that the apparent
improvements of the first LPV election
were temporary.
The 2012 election showed that electoral ad-
ministration was indeed slower and more
costly in the LPV era (Haley & Zubrinich
2013). Furthermore, ethnic divisions remained
salient and evident in campaign activities,
even where LPV had improved the electoral
dividends for cross-ethnic campaigning. There
was little evidence of alliances between candi-
dates or preference-swapping deals (Haley &
Zubrinich 2013). While there was less overt
violence than in past elections, the 2012
election was generally considered to be more
violent than 2007 (Haley & Zubrinich 2013).
Incumbent turnover in 2012 was consistent
with that of pre-LPV elections, suggesting
voter satisfaction with their MPs had not in-
creased (Wood 2017c).
Over three-quarters of winning candidates in
the 2012 election were leading after first prefer-
ences were counted (Wood 2017a). Again, this
suggests that LPV did not change electoral out-
comes in the vast majority of cases. Two of the
cases where the distribution of preferences did
change the outcome, however, were in elector-
ates won by women.
The 2012 election was something of a wa-
tershed for women’s representation. Prior to
the election, there had been a sustained and
high-profile campaign to introduce reserved
seats for women in the Papua New Guinea Par-
liament (Baker 2014). While the campaign was
ultimately unsuccessful in instituting reserved
seats, it did prompt a national debate on
women’s political under-representation. There
was significant media attention on the issue
and a roadshow coordinated by the National
Council of Women visited all of the provinces
in the country to support the reserved seats
campaign. A then-record number of female
candidates stood in the subsequent election,
and three were elected—the best result for
women since the 1977 election.
Only one of the women elected in 2012, De-
lilah Gore in Sohe Open, was also leading on
first preferences. The two other winning female
candidates—Julie Soso in Eastern Highlands
Provincial and Loujaya Kouza (then Toni) in
Lae Open—placed fourth and fifth on first
preferences, respectively, but were able to
gain enough second and third preferences
to win their seats. While the success of Soso
and Kouza show the potential benefits of
LPV for female candidates, in many ways, they
are the exceptions that prove the rule. The aver-
age first preference vote share of female
candidates in 2012 was less than 2 per cent
(Wood 2017c). In general, female candidates
won slightly more preferences than their male
counterparts, but not enough to overcome a
low first preference vote (Wood 2017b). Thus,
LPV did not advantage the typical woman
candidate in 2012, but in a few cases, it did
help women to win. In those cases, the winning
female candidates had strong first preference
votes and favourable conditions. In the Lae
Open seat, for example, the elimination of in-
cumbent MP Bart Philemon, a close relative
of Kouza’s, in the last exclusion, directed a
large amount of preferences to Kouza and
secured her victory.
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Gifting and vote-buying were commonplace
in 2012, with candidates who participated in
these activities in general out-performing other
candidates (Haley & Zubrinich 2013). The
level of money politics practiced in 2012
reflected experiences in the 2007 election and
demonstrated a clear trend in post-LPV
elections. The practice of money politics was
an accepted and often very public facet of
campaigning; in several electorates signs read-
ing ‘Votes for Sale’ were observed (Haley &
Zubrinich 2015).2 There was evidence that
LPV had increased the prevalence of vote-buy-
ing but also democratised it somewhat. Gifts
and cash were generally distributed to individ-
ual voters rather than key powerbrokers (Haley
& Zubrinich 2015).
Overall, the 2012 election was a relatively
good result for women candidates, but how
clearly this can be linked to the introduction
of LPV is unclear. In terms of women’s partic-
ipation as voters, there was high voter turnout
for women, but they were more likely than
men to have assistance forced upon them and
to not fill out their own ballot paper (Haley &
Zubrinich 2013). The promise of more free-
dom of choice under LPV, therefore, is elusive.
The other ‘benefits’ of LPV seen in 2007—
fewer candidates, less violence and greater co-
operation between candidates—were largely
rolled back. Furthermore, the 2012 election
demonstrated a proliferation of money politics,
with predictions that LPV would eventually re-
duce gifting (Kaupa 2013) not borne out by ev-
idence. If anything, the experience of 2012
seemed to suggest the opposite: that preferen-
tial voting was ‘fuellingmoney politics’ (Haley
& Zubrinich 2015, p. 2).
6. The 2017 election
The 2017 election saw further erosion in the
overarching electoral environment. At a de-
brief for leaders of domestic observation teams
in August 2017 in Port Moresby, numerous
participants described 2017 as the worst of
the post-LPV elections. Among incidents in
2017 were the attempted murders of key
electoral officials, attempted kidnappings of
winning candidates and electoral officials, a
premature declaration in the Southern High-
lands Provincial seat before counting had con-
cluded, a double declaration in the Moresby
North-West Open seat and severe instances of
election-related violence resulting in over 100
deaths.
In this tense and insecure electoral environ-
ment, there were significant issues with the in-
clusiveness of the election, especially in terms
of women’s participation. Reports from the
Highlands region especially described an elec-
tion in which women were unable to partici-
pate equal to men (Commonwealth Observer
Group 2017; TIPNG 2017). In 2017, young
women were particularly disenfranchised
(Commonwealth Observer Group 2017).
While there were supposed to be separate
polling booths for women in every polling sta-
tion—to reduce the possibility of intimidation
of female voters—this was not the case in most
polling stations (TIPNG 2017).
While the introduction of LPV has not re-
sulted in an increase of informal votes, as some
observers predicted (Fraenkel 2004), it has
seen higher levels of assisted voting (Com-
monwealth Observer Group 2017). How much
of this assistance is forced is unclear, but we
know from previous elections that women are
more likely to have assistance forced upon
them in polling booths (Haley & Zubrinich
2013). Where women were assisted to vote in
2017, it is usually by a man or group of men
(Commonwealth Observer Group 2017).
The 2017 elections saw money politics play
a significant role, as in 2007 and 2012. In-
stances of voters being offered or soliciting
payment in exchange for their vote were com-
monly reported (TIPNG 2017). It appears from
initial analysis that money politics was not
distributed as evenly as previous elections,
even if the amount of money distributed
overall appears consistent. This represents a
shift in the practice of money politics, rolling
back the ‘democratisation’ seen in 2012, where
individual voters were able to benefit.
While money politics continues to be
2. Photos of similar signs were disseminated on the social
media site Twitter during the 2017 election campaign
period.
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prevalent, the benefits in 2017 were predomi-
nantly directed to key powerbrokers.
The 2017 election saw women’s representa-
tion in Parliament decrease from three to zero.
This marked the worst result in the post-LPV
era. While the outcome for women was disap-
pointing, there were numerous women who
performed very well even if they did not ulti-
mately win. Among these high performers
were incumbent MP for Sohe Open Delilah
Gore, who placed second out of 42 candidates;
Rufina Peter in Central Provincial, who placed
third out of 27 candidates; and Kessy Sawang
in Rai Coast Open, who placed third out of
37 candidates. Yet none of these high-
performing women candidates benefited from
preference distribution in a way that would
have won them the election.
Gore, in Sohe Open, was the leader on the
first preference count, as she was in the 2012
election. Unlike in 2012, however, the prefer-
ence distributions in 2017 eroded rather than
consolidated her lead. On the final preference
count, she lost by fewer than 200 votes. If we
use the first preference count as a proxy for a
plurality majoritarian voting system, Gore
would have won both elections under FPP. In
2012, LPV preference flows secured her win;
in 2017, the preference votes were a
disadvantage.
In the Central Provincial race, Peter came
third on first preferences with 12 per cent of
the vote, behind the eventual winner on 17
per cent, and the incumbent MP on 15 per cent.
While she received roughly the same ratio of
preference votes as the eventual winner, he
was able to maintain his original lead through-
out the count. In this race, as in many others,
the counting of preferences did not fundamen-
tally change the result.
Female candidates in the 2017 election
reported a ‘drier’ election in many parts of
the country—meaning less money changing
hands during the campaign—perhaps
reflecting the dire economic situation of
Papua New Guinea in 2017. In these areas,
women felt they were less disadvantaged than
they might have been otherwise; in the late
stages of the campaign, however, money
politics was allegedly practiced, with key
influential figures within the community or
electoral officials the main recipients of lar-
gesse (Baker 2017b). While the practice of
money politics may have adapted, it has not
disappeared, leaving intact an uneven elec-
toral environment that is biased against
women, who tend to have fewer financial
resources than their higher-performing male
counterparts (Barbara & Baker 2016).
7. Limited preferential voting and women’s
electoral chances
As seen earlier, women’s electoral chances
have not increased substantially since the
introduction of LPV. Women’s political
representation, as in the past, has progressed
unevenly, in fits and starts amidst setbacks.
This is largely due to the fact that LPV does
not change outcomes in the vast majority of
cases. In the 2007 and 2012 elections, be-
tween 76 and 80 per cent of seats were won
by the candidate who was leading after the
first preference count. In LPV elections, the
first preference vote remains the key determi-
nant of success.
These findings are consistent with the results
from LPV elections held in Bougainville, an
autonomous region of Papua New Guinea. In
the 2010 and 2015 Autonomous Bougainville
Government election, only 7.5 and 12.5 per
cent of successful candidates, respectively,
were not leading on first preference count
(Baker 2015). They are also consistent with
results from elections using the similar AV
system in neighbouring countries Fiji and
Australia. Fiji adopted an AVelectoral system
in its 1997 constitution (abrogated in 2009 and
replaced in 2013); in the 2006 election, the last
held using AV, the candidate leading on first
preferences was the winner in all but two seats
(97.2%) (Fraenkel & Firth 2007). In the 2013
Australian election, the distribution of prefer-
ences did not alter the final result in 135 out
of 150 House of Representatives seats (90%)
(Green 2015).
The introduction of LPV has also not done
much to ameliorate underlying issues relating
to political culture that hinder women’s equal
participation in elections. Women in Papua
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New Guinea elections remain vulnerable to in-
timidation and forced assistance. Of course, if
women were allowed greater freedom of
choice in elections, it would not necessarily
follow that they would vote for women; yet
the issues are not entirely unrelated. The
constrained participation of women in Papua
New Guinea elections and the under-represen-
tation of women in Papua New Guinea politics
are two sides of the same coin, both results of
an electoral environment that is male-domi-
nated and hostile to women.
Of course, some women have been suc-
cessful in Papua New Guinea politics, and
research on Pacific women in politics has
shown that other key factors—including fam-
ily connections, wealth and social status—can
effectively trump gender in some cases, even
in very patriarchal societies (Corbett & Liki
2015). Furthermore, a political career is not
a goal for all women who want to effect
societal change (Spark & Corbett 2016).
Nevertheless, for the vast majority of those
that choose to contest, a ‘double burden’ of
patriarchal norms and money politics proves
insurmountable. This is due to both male
and female voters: both participate in money
politics (Haley & Zubrinich 2013); not all
women in Papua New Guinea believe that
women belong in the political sphere; and
many female voters may be uninterested in
advancing the political ambitions of elite
women (Sepoe 1996).
There is a mixed report card on many of the
anticipated benefits of LPV. There has been no
repeat of violence on the scale of the 2002 gen-
eral elections, but we have not seen a consistent
decline in the level of violence and insecurity
in Papua New Guinea elections. Candidate
numbers, bar a small decrease in 2007, have
not gone down; in 2017, there were a record
3,340 candidates, an average of 30 per seat.
The political party system remains weak and
fragmented. Cooperation between candidates
is minimal, and while members are elected
with larger mandates, almost all fall short of a
majority.
Papua New Guinea elections under LPV
have proved costlier, and counting is a slow
and fraught process. Furthermore, since the
introduction of LPV money politics has prolif-
erated; vote-buying, gifting and the manipula-
tion of electoral processes through bribery has
been reported as pervasive in all post-LPV
elections. This has created a political playing
field that is further biased against women,
entrenching male dominance of parliament
and negating any perceived advantages of the
LPV system for women.
That is not to say LPV does not have any
benefits. The main objective of the change
was to produce broader mandates for members
of Parliament. While in most instances, LPV
does not change the overall result, if the results
are perceived to be more legitimate by the gen-
eral public due to the preferential system, it
could still be worthwhile. Wood (2017b) has
found that LPV does slightly advantage female
candidates in that they tend to receive more
preferences than men; yet it does not substan-
tively change outcomes so does not benefit
women in any material way in a patriarchal po-
litical system. While LPV has assisted women
in winning seats in several isolated instances—
namely, Soso and Kouza in 2012—it has also
disadvantaged women, as with Gore in 2017,
or more often than not made no difference to
their electoral chances.
Proposals to adapt the LPV system have
been mooted, such as introducing weighted
preferences (May, Wheen & Haley 2013).
While this may lead to different outcomes,
it would do nothing to decrease the cost of
elections or the length of counting periods.
The electoral systems that global evidence
tells us most advantage female candidates,
closed list proportional representation systems
(Rule 1994), would be unworkable in the
fragmented and weak party system of Papua
New Guinea.
Fundamentally, electoral system reform can
only do so much, as changing the formal rules
of the game is only one part of the story. Insti-
tutional reforms are layered onto existing rules
and norms, related to political culture and
electoral behaviour, that are firmly established
and unyielding; these existing institutions can
hinder or even subvert the goals of reform. In
Papua NewGuinea, this broad political context
includes the widespread acceptance of money
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politics as part of the political system, and a pa-
triarchal political culture that works against
women. Thus, the limitations of any electoral
system reform in producing significant gains
for women are clear.
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